practical activity" (Lenin 1977: 369) . On one hand, indeed, Lenin's phrase could not be more relevant today, when in the context of a worldwide economic crisis, ongoing war, and intermittent episodes of revolt all over the globe, a burgeoning revival of interest in communist theoretical activity is met with equal amounts of enthusiasm and skepticism: enthusiasm because of the creation of new concepts such as horizontality and the revitalization of old ones such as dual power, the commune, or the commons; and skepticism because of the perceived gap that nevertheless continues to separate the theory from the ongoing practices in the streets and from the economic realities that led to the crisis in the first place. On the other hand, further confirming the skeptical reading, Lenin's formulation also turns out to be potentially misleading insofar as it implies that the narrowness of practical activity can be overcome only by importing the most advanced theory to guide the revolutionary movement from the outside, in the guise of the party leadership's vanguard consciousness. This is not only how the phrase was meant originally but also how it has often been received, including, for example, in the 1960s among Louis Althusser's students, some of whom-after denouncing their former teacher-are now behind the rebirth of interest in the idea of communism, such as Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière.
As a matter of fact, to avoid the threat of Stalinist bureaucratization and authoritarianism already implicit in Lenin's formulation from What Is to Be Done?, Badiou and Rancière very early on in their thinking frequently have recourse to what appears to be its complete inversion, this time drawn from the thought of Mao Zedong at the time of the Sino-Soviet split. "Communism cannot be reached unless there is a communist movement," wrote Mao (1977: 136) in his "Critique of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." This formulation, however, is no less misleading than the first one and lends itself to a mirroring abuse-something along the lines of a fascination with what we might call "movementism" or "practicism" as a pendant to the infatuation with "theoreticism" that was the topic of well-known self-criticism in the Althusserian school.
Aside from the fact that there is something both self-aggrandizing and strangely contradictory in the privileged invocation of the practical movement over and against the supposed abstraction of pure theory-especially since this invocation never ceases to be theoretical according to its own criteriathe more important consideration here concerns the misguided opposition of theory and practice. In the Marxist tradition, of course, nothing is easier than to support this binary opposition with the backing of arguments from a venerable line of thinkers, all of whom went in search of a "fusion" between the two. In one of his commemorative references to the 1871 Paris Commune, for example, Lenin (1970: 107-8) wrote: "The pedants of Marxism believe this is all ethical nonsense, romanticism, and absence of realism! No, gentlemen, this is a union of theory and practice of the class struggle"; later on, he adds: "The Marxian doctrine has fused the theory and practice of the class struggle into one inseparable whole. And he is no Marxist who takes a theory that soberly states the objective situation and distorts it into a justification of the existing order and even goes to the length of trying to adapt himself as quickly as possible to every temporary decline in the revolution, to discard 'revolutionary illusions' as quickly as possible, and to turn to 'realistic' thinking." Even if "union" or "fusion" would soon thereafter become the canonical terms for describing the relation of theory and practice within the official state-sponsored philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, as soon as we pose the question in terms of a relation between two independent entities or realms in need of a synthesis, we are off on the wrong foot and more likely than not will end up with an unsavory forced choice between revolutionary illusion and "realistic" conformism.
That being said, Lenin's and Mao's lines can also be interpreted against the grain in a more dialectical fashion-knowing full well that the fate of the dialectic itself is in the balance: not as normative statements implying either that a theory should be brought into the movement from the outside like its vanguard consciousness or that a movement is needed first in order for the theory not to veer off and become a mere illusion or wish-fulfilling fantasy, but as eye-opening statements of fact about the actual presence of transformative theories within the movements themselves. Political movements, in other words, are also and at the same time theoretical acts; conversely, all theoretical or philosophical configurations are likewise to be read as political interventions-say, as diagnostics or as prognosis, whether overt or esoteric. But the crucial point not to be missed is that these insights are but two sides of the same coin. Otherwise we risk smuggling in through the back door the straw man's argument that we thought we kicked out of the front door, namely, the dichotomy of theory and practice.
With respect to the first insight, one of the most intriguing notions comes from the hand of the Mexican writer, activist, and autodidact theoretician José Revueltas in his letters, diary entries, and notes composed from the Lecumberri prison where he was jailed for his alleged role as one of the intellectual instigators behind the student-popular movement of 1968 in Mexico under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. (This allegation, moreover, further confirms if ever we needed it that the false binary of theory and practice is far from being the sorry monopoly of the Left, since the Right too excels in pinning any radical act of contestation on the role of intellectual "instigators," foreign "infiltrators," or agents provocateurs of all colors and stripes, as if protest could not spring from the bosom of corruption and exploitation.) In several texts meant for public diffusion and discussion on the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico that through this very process he hoped to help transform into a critical university, Revueltas (1996: 150) thus coins the expression acto teórico to describe the significance of the events of that watershed year: "The movement of 1968 was essentially a theoretical act, a theoretical action. What does this mean that is so important? Above all, the point is not to devalue theory by subordinating it to the blind activism and practicism that are devoid of any content; nor to affirm that theory happens in the streets-as some contend-born from the rabble." To the contrary, Revueltas adds, speaking of a theoretical act means at the same time specifying and redefining the very nature of theory-its form and its purpose. "Theory is vindictive: it punishes whoever mystifies it; and takes revenge on those who betray and abandon it" (150). 2 As an effort of the intellect of the masses, any political intervention marks at the same time a step forward or backward-depending on the circumstances-in the ceaseless transformation of collective knowledge. To protest is to know; to know is to transform; and to learn is to be controversial. If the theorists are the masses themselves, instead of the vanguard leadership detached from them, then this is what theorists are for in times of riots and distress. As Jodi Dean (2012: 206) also writes in The Communist Horizon: "Precisely because such struggle is necessarily collective, it forges a common desire out of individuated ones, replacing individual weakness with collective strength."
On the other hand, if we look on the false dichotomy between theory and practice from the opposite end, we must also come to understand how certain seemingly purely philosophical debates-for instance, the Kantian critique of dogmatism or the Heideggerian-Derridean deconstruction of metaphysics-are simultaneously ways of taking a practical stance. When I wrote The Actuality of Communism, this insight was one of my original points of departure: I certainly did not pretend to provide the rising tide of protests in response to the 2008 economic crisis with a theoretical consciousness, which would have been a preposterous imposture, but rather to hand theorists something like a crowbar to pry open the philosophical enclosures in which we find ourselves in the wake of the so-called deconstruction of metaphysics. In other words, the aim was not to provide practice with a theory but to trace new lines of demarcation within theory to see if so-called radical philosophy can stand up to the test of actually embracing the idea of a communist Left. 3 Since then, I likewise continue to be interested in grasping exactly how concepts such as difference, retreat, inoperativity, affect, or community, particularly in the ways they have been treated in post-Heideggerian and post-Derridean thought, can be read not only as philosophical responses to the defeat of 1960s radicalism but also as active, even if unwitting, participants in perpetuating the situation that led to this defeatlest we fall for the temptations of what is then often ominously referred to as "the worst" (le pire). In this sense, much theorizing today continues to be spellbound by what I call "philosophies of defeat," in the double sense of the genitive. These are both philosophies that are (in the objective sense of the genitive) the effect of the crushing defeat of prior radicalisms, and philosophies that (in the subjective sense) threaten to defeat any attempt to exit, let alone overcome, the resulting order of things. 4 Incidentally, I believe that the passage from theory to philosophy that we have witnessed since the mid-1980s, aside from entailing a decidedly Eurocentric regression, is also a symptomatic expression of the same historical trend toward restoring the institutional status quo, at least at the level of thought's philosophical selfimage, as opposed to the inherent instability and increasing globality of the category of theory. Consider, for example, how Althusser's different "groups of theoretical reflection" from the 1960s were succeeded two decades later by entities such as the "Center for the Philosophical Study of the Political" that Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe founded in the same elite space of the Ecole Normale Supérieure in rue d'Ulm; or how even Badiou moved on from his Maoist-inspired books, significantly titled Theory of Contradiction and Theory of the Subject, to writing Manifesto for Philosophy in the name of a neoclassical return to Platonism. In fact, when it does not opt for the traditional format of philosophy, one of the only ways in which the defeatist stance of postmetaphysical thought can still garner for itself the appeal of radicalism is via some convoluted argument or other about the resistance to theory. The proof, then, is not in the pudding so much as in the fact that so many people refuse to eat it.
As I mentioned before, however, these questions about the efficacy of theory must be inscribed within a larger set of problems in which what is at stake concerns, first, the status of the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic in general and, then, the particular relations not just of theory and practice but also of the political and the economic. After all, in the original formulation from What Is to Be Done? with which I started, Lenin was commenting on a passage in which Friedrich Engels-implicitly drawing on the famous view of the three component parts of Marxism that are French politics, English economics, and German philosophy-speaks of theory as one of three fronts of struggle. Waxing enthusiastic about the momentum gained in the 1870s by the German workers, in a way that Lenin in his own time hopes to transfer to their Russian counterparts, Engels writes: "For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted pursuant to its three sides-the theoretical, the political, and the practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists)-in harmony and in its interconnections, and in a systematic way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack, that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies." 5 Contrary to this hopeful view from the heydays of Marxism, several of the articles in the present collection argue that part of the problem with the current revival of interest in communism stems from the fact that nowadays the idea has become divorced from the material conditions that alone gave the idea a communist content and a recognizable organizational form, that is, above all, the form of the party.
This larger argument about the fate of the dialectic, in its turn, can take roughly three forms. The first, which none of the contributors to this collection adopts but which is utterly common among deconstructionistsindeed so common as to become easily and justifiably caricatured-holds that even when put back on its feet in Marx's inversion, the dialectic handed down to us from Hegel and the Young Hegelians stands as the veritable culmination of Western metaphysics. As such, the whole arsenal of binary oppositions, including those of theory and practice, base and superstructure, or the ideal and the material, must be patiently deconstructed instead of being allowed to enter the unstoppable dialectical movement of the spirit that negates, subsumes, and sublates them, in the sense of Hegel's famous bon mot of Auf hebung, into the Absolute. In fact, the primary way in which this first broad argument enters into the theoretical discussions of the idea of communism today is through its wholesale rebuttal in book after book by Slavoj Žižek, most notably in his massive recent tome Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, in which the Slovene philosopher forcefully repeats his argument that from the beginning the dialectic is necessarily materialist-having nothing whatsoever to do with the cancellation of difference in favor of metaphysical identity but everything with the shattering movement of pure self-related negativity. According to Žižek, therefore, no apologies are needed to inscribe the communist idea in what has never been a metaphysical concept of the dialectic anyway but instead the thoroughly materialist and antimetaphysical machine of Hegelianism.
By contrast, a second formulation adopts a more historical perspective. Instead of offering a wholesale deconstruction or an equally totalizing defense of the dialectical tradition as such, this view sets out to periodize the notion of the dialectic, particularly by establishing that, from Marx to Lenin to Mao, the dialectical method itself undergoes crucial transformations that are motivated not by the rules of theoretical consistency alone but also by the lessons learned from the political experiments of its time. Thus for the author of Das Kapital there would have existed a certain relation of transitivity between history and politics, or between the working class as a social category and the proletariat as an organizational operator devoid of all substance; for the author of What Is to Be Done? the need for a party vanguard already indicates the presence of a gap to be mediated between social being and consciousness, or between the class in-itself and the class for-itself; whereas for Mao, especially in the period of the "Critique of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," history becomes absorbed into politics as the name for its relatively autonomous and entirely contingent unfolding according to a periodization of its own. Among the contributors to the present collection, Alessandro Russo relies partly on such a historicization of the dialectic, which he otherwise shares with his friends Badiou and Sylvain Lazarus. But the same problematization of history already constitutes the backdrop against which we could and probably should revisit Étienne Balibar's theory of transition from his canonical period when he coauthored Reading Capital with Althusser, as studied here in the contribution by Alberto Toscano. However, unlike Badiou or Balibar, who in recent years have managed to combine a critique of the Marxist notion of transitivity or class essentialism with a fortified defense of communist politics, Russo considers communism too to be part of the older legacy-what he elsewhere calls the Marxian dialectical episteme as a way to theorize the link between history and politics-so that both the dialectical method and the communist idea, unless they can be given new experimental forms, can be said to have reached their expiration date in the wake of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: "It is because of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (as well as many other worldwide political crises of the 1960s and 1970s) that some of the basic categories of modern knowledge concerned with the investigation of politics are now considered dubious," Russo writes elsewhere. "One can trace back to the 1960s and 1970s a growing uncertainty, not only about actual political value, but also about the cultural substance of historico-social categories such as class, class struggle, modes of production, the state, equality, political parties, and so forth. Furthermore, the conceptual field has since become more and more intellectually confused" (Russo 1998: 179-80) .
As late as in his Theory of the Subject, for example, Badiou himself still holds on to the traditional Marxian notion of the articulation between history and politics as mapped onto the dialectic of productive masses and partisan class. "Class, apprehended according to the dialectical division of its dialecticity, means partisan political action anchored in the productive historicity of the masses," he claims. "The whole point is to know how all this works together, because it is this working-together that is class. This entails nothing less than to make the rectifiable singularity of politics rise up in the real movement of history" (Badiou 2009: 27) . Badiou subsequently abandons this view of the transitivity or, at the very least, the dialectical workingtogether of masses and classes, organized through partisan action. Yet this does not mean that he forgoes the category of history altogether. In fact, in The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings, Badiou maintains much of the grammar of the articulation in question, but now the history in which all politics is said to be "anchored" or "rooted" no longer refers to objective factors but instead becomes wholly internal to the subjective process of sustaining a political event as such. For the post-Marxist or post-Maoist in Badiou, as I have tried to show elsewhere, the point is no longer to politicize history but to historicize politics. 6 If there is a rebirth or reawakening of history, it is no longer based in the objective history of the class struggle but in the becoming-historical of certain spontaneous revolts and uprisings and in the making-political of those historical riots. Henceforth, in other words, all there is to the dialectic, if this is still what we want to call the theory of the event, is an intrinsic periodization of spontaneous riot, historical movement, and political organization. And so the new version of the old question asked in Theory of the Subject in terms of masses and classes becomes the following in The Rebirth of History, "How are we to inscribe politically, as active materiality under the sign of the Idea, a reawakening of History?," particularly if such inscriptions are no longer predetermined but instead both rare and contingent: "Let us simply note that if every political truth is rooted in a massive popular event, it nevertheless cannot be said that it is reducible to it" (Badiou 2012: 67, 89) .
Finally, a third argument about the fate of the dialectic involves a rather strange and uncanny inversion of this historical view. Joshua Clover and Aaron Benanav thus agree that the time has come and gone for the viewwhat they call "programmatism," taking a clue from Gilles Dauvé-that links history and politics through the mediating form of the party, with its characteristic program or platform. Yet not only do they continue to embrace the notion of communism, particularly in the guise of an underlying fidelity to the Oakland Commune; they also insist on the need materially to anchor any political analysis in the critique of political economy, following the canonical example of Marx's theories of value, crisis, and revolutionary upheaval in the Grundrisse and Capital. The result is nothing short of an explosive combination in which Marx's method, seemingly immune to the ravages of time perhaps because it is, after all, a theory of time's capacity for ravage in the struggle between dead and living labor, is mobilized to combat the supposed obsolescence of contemporary arguments for the party-form of politics.
However, unless we are to consider the contemporary theorizations of communism as doubly idealist, or as idealist to the second degree, that is, first as theoretical fantasies separated from economic realities and material struggles and second as theories unable to fathom even this fact of their separation, the various critiques of the fate of the dialectic must still come to an understanding of how such flights of fancy are even possible to begin with. If these theoretical arguments have turned into sheer illusions only today, then when and why-under what material conditions-were they more than just an illusion? If they were never actually idealist illusions but only stereotypical caricatures of the materialist dialectic proper, then what accounts for the all-too-common nature and lasting success of the caricatures in the long run? Finally, if they always involved essentialist or metaphysical mistakes from the start, then why has the critique of class essentialism only taken off for good in the second half of the twentieth century with the deconstruction of metaphysics and the concomitant crisis of Marxism? And how can the argument of outdatedness itself be phrased in terms of a seemingly timeless method for the critique of political economy?
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, George Ciccariello-Maher, and Susana Draper, for their part, manage to avoid many of these dilemmas insofar as they try to steer a tentative but highly alluring course somewhere in between acknowledging historical failures and dead ends, on the one hand, and incorporating new experiments and utopian promises, on the other. In their theorizations, the painful limitations of state-centered forms of socialism are definitely taken into account, but not to the exclusive benefit of struggles centered on the commons, the commune, or the community. Instead, the symptomatic novelty that emerges from these readings, aside from a much-needed reopening of the theoretical debate onto the global or international scene in Bolivia and Venezuela, as announced by Gavin Walker and Jason E. Smith in their ambitious opening pieces, falls under the heading of a generalized situation of dual power. Thus, between state and commune, between party and riot, between organization and insurrection, between movement from below and leadership from above, the idea of communism itself is afflicted by an inescapable duality. As James Martel and Banu Bargu also suggest in their careful analyses of Dean's theoretical formation, this duality is not even a weakness but a strength: a new sense of collectivity built around division instead of unity, rupture instead of cohesion, and controversy instead of blind obedience to the authorities that be.
In the end, all the above questions point toward a single controversial lesson, which can be summed up as an invitation to avoid the all-too-facile invocations of the eleventh and final thesis in Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," the one that asks us to move on from the various philosophical interpretations of the world to its transformation. First, as Althusser also suggests in a little-known analysis, nothing is said in this thesis about the subject responsible for transforming the world. The place of this subject is left vacant, but in all likelihood, given Marx's antiphilosophical tendencies at the time, the empty slot was not to be occupied by yet another band of philosophers. Second, even the argument for the much-vaunted primacy of practice, which often seeks to authorize itself by invoking this thesis, cannot avoid presenting itself paradoxically as a theoretical argument. And, finally, what Marx is addressing in all eleven of his theses is a mode of theory-a critical social theory-in which theoretical activity would in turn find a place next to and in tandem with other, economic-political or ideological practices. Althusser (1994: 37-42 ) thus hopes to explain how, once the Marxist science of history accomplishes this task in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the Grundrisse, and Capital, we no longer need to dwell on the glorious past summarized in the "Theses on Feuerbach." Yet if in fact it is the case that they are merely a ladder that we can throw away once we have reached the scientific heights of theoretical rigor in the mature Marx, then why do the "Theses" continue to exert such irresistible influence on generation after generation of students, intellectuals, and militants? Why do we let ourselves be disarmed and seduced by their charm? If, moreover, they were never meant for publication but merely served their author as a momentary aid in self-clarification, why do these theses beckon to us with their appeal even long after we have dutifully digested some or all of the published volumes of Capital? According to the late Ecuadoran-born Bolívar Echeverría, from whom newer generations of intellectuals such as Jorge Veraza, Álvaro García Linera, and Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar learned their Marx at the National Autonomous University in Mexico, this has to do with the utopian promise contained in the very paradoxical way in which the "Theses" theorize the effects of theory. In other words, if so many people continue to enjoy beating others over the head for "merely" interpreting the world while they like to think of themselves as participating in the "transforming" of the world, such an enjoyment is actually the symptomatic expression of a desire that cannot be fulfilled without a change in the material conditions of our forms of thinking. The fascination with Marx's "Theses" thus would stem from the fact that they promise precisely the possibility that critical thinking might have an efficacy of its own that is nonetheless part and parcel of a utopian impulse without which a radical transformation of society is impossible. Their truth is not meant to lead to a better or alternative (scientific or materialist) theory to be set side by side with other (bourgeois or idealist) ones in the marketplace of ideas. On the contrary: "The 'truth' of the theoretical discourse-and thus also its 'falsity,' its flight into 'mysticism'-can be explained only if this discourse is conceived as an intrinsic moment of the practical-historical process in its totality (and not as the independent act of adequate or inadequate, 'realistic' or 'unrealistic' figuration of a thing)," Echeverría concludes. "In other words, its 'truth' is its 'power,' its specific contribution or participation in the concrete realization of a fundamental tendency in this practical-historical process" (Echeverría 2011: 28-29) . Finally, we could say that the only thing that theorists are good for in times of riots and distress is to prepare the practical conditions in which we would no longer have any need or room for theory as a separate activity. Perhaps we might even be so generous as to suspect that behind the countless attacks against "mere" theory that so frequently take the form of a vulgar anti-intellectual variation on the eleventh of Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," the enigmatic element of the "more" or "extra" that is demanded of theoretical work is precisely this utopian impulse of preparing the conditions for its own abolition.
Notes
None of this would have been possible without the kind invitation by Michael Hardt to organize a special issue of SAQ around The Actuality of Communism and The Communist Horizon. At Cornell University, Jodi Dean and I also had the opportunity to bring together most contributors to this special issue for a one-day symposium, "Communist Currents," in November 2013, sponsored by Cornell's Society for the Humanities under its interim director, Brett de Bary; the Program for French Studies directed by Laurent Dubreuil; and the Department of Government. On this occasion, we were also joined by Camille Robcis, Jordana Rosenberg, and Anna Marie Smith. Our heartfelt thanks to everyone who helped us bring this all together.
1 Quoting Friedrich Hölderlin, Martin Heidegger's question, of course, is not about theorists (or about riots) but about poets (and their foundational gestures): "What are poets for in times of distress?" See Heidegger 1971: 87-139. However, as I suggest in my conclusion, there is an intimate relation between poets and theorists in this regard, especially via the appeal exerted by an image of their imminent self-abolition for the sake of a world in which their existence is no longer needed. 2
For further discussion of Revueltas's notion of theory, see chapters 2 and 3 in Bosteels 2012. 3 See, in particular, the first two chapters of Bosteels 2011. 4 See Bosteels, forthcoming. 5 Quoted in Lenin 1977: 372. 6 For Badiou's changing views of history and politics, see also chapters 3 and 7 in Bosteels 2011.
